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Single Idea 10715
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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Full Idea
Properties in semantic theory: functions from worlds to extensions ('Californian'), reference, as opposed to sense, of predicates (Frege), reference to universals (Russell), reference to situations (Barwise/Perry), and composition from context (Lewis).
Gist of Idea
There are five main semantic theories for properties
Source
Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §02 n12)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.16
A Reaction
[compressed; 'Californian' refers to Carnap and Montague; the Lewis view is p,67 of Oliver]. Frege misses out singular terms, or tries to paraphrase them away. Barwise and Perry sound promising to me. Situations involve powers.
The
29 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Properties'
10714
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The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
[Oliver]
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10715
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There are five main semantic theories for properties
[Oliver]
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10468
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A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
[Oliver]
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10471
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Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
[Oliver]
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10716
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There are just as many properties as the laws require
[Oliver]
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10472
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'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
[Oliver]
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10720
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We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
[Oliver]
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10721
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If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
[Oliver]
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10719
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There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
[Oliver]
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10722
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Instantiation is set-membership
[Oliver]
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10726
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Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
[Oliver]
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10730
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If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
[Oliver]
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10724
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Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
[Oliver]
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7963
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Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
[Oliver]
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7962
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Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
[Oliver]
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10727
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Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
[Oliver]
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10725
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Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
[Oliver]
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10739
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The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
[Oliver]
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10741
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Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
[Oliver]
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10738
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Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
[Oliver]
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10740
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The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
[Oliver]
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10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
[Oliver]
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10745
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Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
[Oliver]
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10744
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Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
[Oliver]
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10746
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Conceptual priority is barely intelligible
[Oliver]
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10747
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Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
[Oliver]
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10748
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Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
[Oliver]
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10749
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Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
[Oliver]
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10750
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Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
[Oliver]
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