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Single Idea 10717

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties ]

Full Idea

Lewis argues that there are natural properties, which makes various analyses possible, especially of similarity in intrinsic respects. Naturalness comes in degrees, with perfectly natural properties being the limiting case.

Gist of Idea

Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects

Source

report of David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 4

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.18


A Reaction

This sounds to be the wrong way round. We don't start with similarities and work back to natural properties. We encounter natural properties (through their causal action), and these give rise to the similarities.


The 33 ideas from 'New work for a theory of universals'

Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]