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Single Idea 10723
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
]
Full Idea
Lewis proposes that a property is the set of its actual and possible instances.
Gist of Idea
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
Source
report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 10
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.22
A Reaction
I just can't make sense of any proposal that a property is a set. Things fall into natural sets because they have properties. Only a philosopher would believe such a weird proposal as this one. Triangular and trilateral?
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[properties are just classes of certain objects]:
21575
|
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group
[Russell]
|
9127
|
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property
[Russell, by Sorensen]
|
15478
|
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes
[Martin,CB]
|
12672
|
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
[Ellis]
|
19173
|
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
|
9783
|
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes
[Cartwright,R]
|
15399
|
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
15732
|
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
[Lewis]
|
15733
|
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
[Lewis]
|
15734
|
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
[Lewis]
|
9655
|
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
[Lewis]
|
10723
|
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
9653
|
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
[Lewis]
|
16290
|
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
[Lewis]
|
15516
|
A property is any class of possibilia
[Lewis]
|
4038
|
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate')
[Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
14499
|
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars
[Lewis, by Koslicki]
|
7703
|
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
[Jacquette]
|
18511
|
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
|
10591
|
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it
[Shapiro]
|
21729
|
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property
[Linsky,B]
|
10413
|
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
[Swoyer]
|