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Single Idea 10727

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals ]

Full Idea

We may have to accept uninstantiated universals because the properties and relations of abstract objects may need to be acknowledged.

Gist of Idea

Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.28


A Reaction

This is the problem of 'abstract reference'. 'Courage matters more than kindness'; 'Pink is more like red than like yellow'. Not an impressive argument. All you need is second-level abstraction.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [universals existing apart from their actual instances]:

Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]