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Full Idea
Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers.
Gist of Idea
Universals explain resemblance and causal power
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.30
A Reaction
Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728.
Related Idea
Idea 10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |