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Full Idea
If universals are to ground similarities, it is hard to see why one should admit universals which only happen to be instantiated once.
Gist of Idea
If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
Source
Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.32
A Reaction
He is criticising Armstrong, who holds that universals must be instantiated. This is a good point about any metaphysics which makes resemblance basic.
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |