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Single Idea 10741
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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Full Idea
Some trope theorists give accounts of particulars. Sets of tropes will not do because they are always abstract, but we might say that particulars are (concrete) mereological wholes of the tropes which they instantiate.
Gist of Idea
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
Source
Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §12)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.35
A Reaction
Looks like a non-starter to me. How can abstract entities add up to a mereological whole which is concrete?
The
29 ideas
from Alex Oliver
10714
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The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
[Oliver]
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10715
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There are five main semantic theories for properties
[Oliver]
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10468
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A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
[Oliver]
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10471
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Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
[Oliver]
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10716
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There are just as many properties as the laws require
[Oliver]
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10472
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'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
[Oliver]
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10720
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We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
[Oliver]
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10721
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If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
[Oliver]
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10719
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There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
[Oliver]
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10722
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Instantiation is set-membership
[Oliver]
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10726
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Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
[Oliver]
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10725
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Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
[Oliver]
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10727
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Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
[Oliver]
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10730
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If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
[Oliver]
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10724
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Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
[Oliver]
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7963
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Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
[Oliver]
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7962
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Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
[Oliver]
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10739
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The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
[Oliver]
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10738
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Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
[Oliver]
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10740
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The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
[Oliver]
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10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
[Oliver]
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10741
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Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
[Oliver]
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10745
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Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
[Oliver]
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10744
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Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
[Oliver]
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10746
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Conceptual priority is barely intelligible
[Oliver]
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10747
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Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
[Oliver]
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10748
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Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
[Oliver]
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10749
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Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
[Oliver]
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10750
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Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
[Oliver]
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