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Single Idea 10744

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism ]

Full Idea

We can say that 'Harvard-nominalism' is the thesis that there are no abstract objects, 'Oz-nominalism' that there are no universals, and Goodman's nominalism rejects entities, such as sets, which fail to obey a certain principle of composition.

Gist of Idea

Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §15 n46)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.44

A Reaction

Personally I'm a Goodman-Harvard-Oz nominalist. What are you rebelling against? What have you got? We've been mesmerized by the workings of our own minds, which are trying to grapple with a purely physical world.

The 29 ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Properties'

10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]