more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
For a predicate to have a referential function is one way, but not the only way, to harbour ontological commitment.
Gist of Idea
Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
Source
Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §22)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.63
A Reaction
Presumably the main idea is that the predicate makes some important contribution to a sentence which is held to be true. Maybe reference is achieved by the whole sentence, rather than by one bit of it.
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| 10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
| 10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |