more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 10750

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

Slingshot Argument: if truth-makers work for equivalent sentences and co-referring substitute sentences, then if 'the numbers + S1 = the numbers' has a truth-maker, then 'the numbers + S2 = the numbers' will have the same truth-maker.

Gist of Idea

Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §24)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.73


A Reaction

[compressed] Hence every sentence has the same truth-maker! Truth-maker fans must challenge one of the premises.

Related Idea

Idea 19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]


The 15 ideas with the same theme [opposing the claim that all truths have truthmakers]:

Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]