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Single Idea 10785
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
]
Full Idea
It has been suggested that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims.
Gist of Idea
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism
Source
Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.161)
Book Ref
'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.161
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[quantifiers range over expressions instead of objects]:
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9874
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Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification
[Dummett on Frege]
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10800
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The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions
[Ryle, by Quine]
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21642
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If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology
[Quine]
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9025
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You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named
[Quine]
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9026
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Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
[Quine]
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10801
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Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions
[Quine]
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10793
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Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal
[Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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10785
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Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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10795
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Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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10798
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A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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10009
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Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account
[Wallace, by Baldwin]
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10792
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The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation
[Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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18123
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Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name
[Bostock]
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9469
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Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities
[Parsons,C]
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9468
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On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true
[Parsons,C]
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15533
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We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names
[Lewis]
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9465
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Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
[Jacquette]
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9466
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Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
[Jacquette]
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12222
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Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions
[Fine,K]
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13674
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We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models
[Shapiro]
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15136
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Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances
[Williamson]
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8475
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The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance
[Orenstein]
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17988
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Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
[Hofweber]
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