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Single Idea 10795

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification ]

Full Idea

Translation into a substitutional language does not force the ontology. It remains, literally, and until the case for reference can be made, a façon de parler. That is the way the nominalist would like to keep it.

Gist of Idea

Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking

Source

Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.166)

Book Ref

'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.166


The 22 ideas from Ruth Barcan Marcus

Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]