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Single Idea 10798

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification ]

Full Idea

Critics say if there are nondenumerably many objects, then on the substitutional view there might be true universal sentences falsified by an unnamed object, and there must always be some such, for names are denumerable.

Gist of Idea

A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object

Source

Ruth Barcan Marcus (Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers [1978], p.167)

Book Ref

'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology', ed/tr. Jacquette,Dale [Blackwell 2002], p.167


A Reaction

[See Quine 'Reply to Prof. Marcus' p.183] The problem seems to be that there would be names which are theoretically denumerable, but not nameable, and hence not available for substitution. Marcus rejects this, citing compactness.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [quantifiers range over expressions instead of objects]:

Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]