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Single Idea 10800

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification ]

Full Idea

Ryle objected somewhere to my dictum that 'to be is to be the value of a variable', arguing that the values of variables are expressions, and hence that my dictum repudiates all things except expressions.

Gist of Idea

The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions

Source

report of Gilbert Ryle (works [1950]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.183

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.183


A Reaction

I have a lot of sympathy with Ryle's view, and I associate it with the peculiar Millian view that we can somehow replace a name in a sentence with the actual physical object. Objects can't be parts of sentences - and maybe they can't be 'values'.


The 26 ideas from Gilbert Ryle

There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]