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Single Idea 10801

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification ]

Full Idea

When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to.

Gist of Idea

Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions

Source

Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.183

A Reaction

An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [quantifiers range over expressions instead of objects]:

9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
10800 The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10009 Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
18123 Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
9469 Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
9468 On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
9465 Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
9466 Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
12222 Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
13674 We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]