more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 10817

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

It is normally claimed that Tarski defined truth using no undefined semantic terms, but I argue that he reduced the notion of truth to certain other semantic notions, but did not in any way explicate these other notions.

Gist of Idea

Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions

Source

Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §0)

Book Ref

'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.365

The 18 ideas with the same theme ['satisfaction' as a means of defining truth]:

14454 An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
19184 The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
19191 Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
19316 Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19175 Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
15410 Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
18811 Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
15365 We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
19314 For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
13504 Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
13634 Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]