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Single Idea 10819

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth ]

Full Idea

Model theory must choose the denotations of the primitives so that all of a group of sentences come out true, so we need a theory of how the truth value of a sentence depends on the denotation of its primitive nonlogical parts, which Tarski gives us.

Gist of Idea

Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model

Source

Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972], §1)

Book Ref

'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.369


The 6 ideas with the same theme [role of truth in various systems of formal logic]:

There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant]
Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]