more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 10837
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
]
Full Idea
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.
Gist of Idea
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements
Source
Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
Book Ref
'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.231
A Reaction
This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else.
The
132 ideas
from Michael Dummett
16953
|
Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical
[Dummett]
|
16952
|
If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive
[Dummett]
|
16951
|
It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure
[Dummett]
|
16954
|
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much
[Dummett]
|
16956
|
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action
[Dummett]
|
16960
|
If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system
[Dummett]
|
16958
|
In S4 the actual world has a special place
[Dummett]
|
16957
|
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility
[Dummett]
|
16959
|
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality
[Dummett]
|
15939
|
For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true
[Dummett]
|
18832
|
Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value
[Dummett]
|
15938
|
Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed
[Dummett]
|
9181
|
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use
[Dummett]
|
9182
|
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated
[Dummett]
|
19168
|
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects
[Dummett, by Davidson]
|
10320
|
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns
[Dummett, by Hale]
|
10547
|
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference
[Dummett]
|
10543
|
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression
[Dummett]
|
10545
|
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change
[Dummett]
|
10541
|
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension
[Dummett]
|
10555
|
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active
[Dummett]
|
10548
|
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence'
[Dummett]
|
10281
|
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language
[Dummett]
|
10532
|
We can understand universals by studying predication
[Dummett]
|
10534
|
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects
[Dummett]
|
10549
|
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements
[Dummett]
|
10531
|
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege
[Dummett]
|
10516
|
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects
[Dummett, by Hale]
|
10540
|
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract
[Dummett]
|
10554
|
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal
[Dummett]
|
10552
|
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate
[Dummett]
|
10515
|
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects
[Dummett, by Hale]
|
10544
|
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral?
[Dummett]
|
10546
|
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction
[Dummett]
|
10537
|
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}}
[Dummett]
|
10542
|
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative
[Dummett]
|
17621
|
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects
[Dummett]
|
9848
|
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity
[Dummett, by Dummett]
|
9993
|
There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical'
[Dummett, by Tait]
|
18257
|
Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals?
[Dummett]
|
18255
|
Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles
[Dummett]
|
9896
|
A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone
[Dummett]
|
9895
|
A number is a multitude composed of units
[Dummett]
|
9820
|
In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical
[Dummett]
|
9829
|
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting
[Dummett]
|
9828
|
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1
[Dummett]
|
9836
|
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects
[Dummett]
|
9833
|
To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too
[Dummett]
|
9842
|
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular
[Dummett]
|
9847
|
A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution
[Dummett]
|
9852
|
We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them
[Dummett]
|
9849
|
Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept
[Dummett]
|
9850
|
An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation
[Dummett]
|
9857
|
We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus'
[Dummett]
|
9858
|
Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual
[Dummett]
|
9859
|
It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers
[Dummett]
|
9860
|
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object
[Dummett]
|
9869
|
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences
[Dummett]
|
9872
|
Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly
[Dummett]
|
9873
|
Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically
[Dummett]
|
9885
|
The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem
[Dummett]
|
9880
|
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects
[Dummett]
|
9884
|
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy
[Dummett]
|
9876
|
Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex?
[Dummett]
|
11066
|
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage
[Dummett, by Hanna]
|
19058
|
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples
[Dummett]
|
19060
|
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning
[Dummett]
|
19059
|
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1
[Dummett]
|
19061
|
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question
[Dummett]
|
19062
|
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions
[Dummett]
|
19063
|
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established
[Dummett]
|
19064
|
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible
[Dummett]
|
19065
|
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory
[Dummett]
|
19066
|
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science
[Dummett]
|
19067
|
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step
[Dummett]
|
18801
|
Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions
[Dummett]
|
18073
|
Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability
[Dummett, by Kitcher]
|
19054
|
Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language
[Dummett]
|
19055
|
Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence
[Dummett]
|
19056
|
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions
[Dummett]
|
19057
|
Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances
[Dummett]
|
9186
|
First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions
[Dummett]
|
9187
|
Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically
[Dummett]
|
9191
|
Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence
[Dummett]
|
9192
|
The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure
[Dummett]
|
9193
|
ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality
[Dummett]
|
9194
|
The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets
[Dummett]
|
9195
|
Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof
[Dummett]
|
19052
|
Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences
[Dummett]
|
19053
|
Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates
[Dummett]
|
22297
|
Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities
[Dummett, by Potter]
|
15049
|
Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true
[Dummett]
|
8163
|
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
[Dummett]
|
8161
|
We know we can state facts, with true statements
[Dummett]
|
8165
|
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view
[Dummett]
|
8167
|
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes
[Dummett]
|
8166
|
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
|
8168
|
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
[Dummett]
|
8170
|
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something
[Dummett]
|
8169
|
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content
[Dummett]
|
8176
|
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used
[Dummett]
|
8175
|
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions
[Dummett]
|
8174
|
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought
[Dummett]
|
8173
|
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates
[Dummett]
|
8179
|
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence
[Dummett]
|
8178
|
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale
[Dummett]
|
8180
|
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
[Dummett]
|
8181
|
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
[Dummett]
|
8182
|
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power
[Dummett]
|
8183
|
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change
[Dummett]
|
8184
|
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it
[Dummett]
|
8185
|
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind
[Dummett]
|
8186
|
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change
[Dummett]
|
19171
|
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means
[Dummett, by Davidson]
|
10837
|
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements
[Dummett]
|
10838
|
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage
[Dummett]
|
10839
|
You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour
[Dummett]
|
10840
|
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game
[Dummett]
|
8189
|
Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth
[Dummett]
|
8191
|
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth
[Dummett]
|
8190
|
Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth
[Dummett]
|
8192
|
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it
[Dummett]
|
8193
|
Verification is not an individual but a collective activity
[Dummett]
|
8194
|
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence
[Dummett]
|
8195
|
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense
[Dummett]
|
8197
|
Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real
[Dummett]
|
8196
|
The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless
[Dummett]
|
8198
|
A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'
[Dummett]
|
8199
|
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy
[Dummett]
|
21628
|
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible
[Dummett]
|
3303
|
For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects
[Dummett, by Benardete,JA]
|
7334
|
Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle
[Dummett, by Miller,A]
|