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Full Idea
We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
Gist of Idea
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage
Source
Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
Book Ref
'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.231
A Reaction
Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |