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Full Idea
For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
Gist of Idea
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game
Source
Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
Book Ref
'The Nature of Truth', ed/tr. Lynch, Michael P. [MIT 2001], p.237
A Reaction
The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |