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Full Idea
Instances of the truthmaker principle are equivalent to biconditionals not about truth but about the existential grounding of all manner of other things; the flying pigs, or what-have-you.
Gist of Idea
Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth
Source
David Lewis (Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth' [2001])
Book Ref
-: 'Analysis' [-], p.279
A Reaction
The question then is what the difference is between 'existential grounding' and 'truth'. There wouldn't seem to be any difference at all if the proposition in question was a simple existential claim.
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |