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Single Idea 10912

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience.

Gist of Idea

Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences

Source

Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.82


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what determines truths]:

The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]