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Single Idea 10919

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts ]

Full Idea

What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?

Gist of Idea

What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone?

Source

John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48)


A Reaction

This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer.


The 24 ideas from John Duns Scotus

Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]