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Full Idea
What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?
Gist of Idea
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone?
Source
John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48)
A Reaction
This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer.
| 15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
| 15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
| 13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
| 16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
| 16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
| 16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
| 16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |