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Full Idea
Necessity does not properly apply to the fulfilment of conditions by objects (such as the number which numbers the planets), apart from special ways of specifying them.
Gist of Idea
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified
Source
Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §3)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.151
A Reaction
This appears to say that the only necessity is 'de dicto', and that there is no such thing as 'de re' necessity (of the thing in itself). How can Quine deny that there might be de re necessities? His point is epistemological - how can we know them?
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |