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Full Idea
Perhaps there is no objection to quantifying into modal contexts as long as the values of any variables thus quantified are limited to intensional objects, but they also lead to disturbing examples.
Clarification
'Intensional' objects are in thought rather than in reality
Gist of Idea
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely
Source
Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §3)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.152
A Reaction
[Quine goes on to give his examples] I take it that possibilities are features of actual reality, not merely objects of thought. The problem is that they are harder to know than actual objects.
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |