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Full Idea
A reversion to Aristotelian essentialism is required if quantification into modal contexts is to be insisted on. An object must be seen as having some of its traits necessarily.
Gist of Idea
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence
Source
Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §3)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.155
A Reaction
This thought leads directly to Kripke's proposal of rigid designation of objects (and Lewis response of counterparts), which really gets modal logic off the ground. Quine's challenge remains - the modal logic entails a huge metaphysical commitment.
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |