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Single Idea 10931

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

To say an object is soluble in water is to say that it would dissolve if it were in water,..which implies that 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves'. Yet we do not know if there is a suitable sense of 'necessarily' into which we can so quantify.

Gist of Idea

We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally

Source

Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §4)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.158


A Reaction

This is why there has been a huge revival of scientific essentialism - because Krike seems to offer exacty the account which Quine said was missing. So can you have modal logic without rigid designation?


The 17 ideas with the same theme [objections to essences in scientific investigation]:

The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]
The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]