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Single Idea 10938
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
]
Full Idea
It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.
Gist of Idea
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
Source
Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.
The
21 ideas
from Adolph Rami
10938
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The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
[Rami]
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10934
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Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties
[Rami]
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10933
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Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
[Rami]
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10932
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If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'
[Rami]
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10939
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'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
[Rami]
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10940
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An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object
[Rami]
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18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
[Rami]
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18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
[Rami]
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
[Rami]
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18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
[Rami]
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18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
[Rami]
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18336
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Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
[Rami]
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18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
[Rami]
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18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
[Rami]
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18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
[Rami]
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18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
[Rami]
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18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
[Rami]
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18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
[Rami]
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
[Rami]
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
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18350
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Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
[Rami]
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