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Full Idea
It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.
Gist of Idea
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
Source
Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7
A Reaction
Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |