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Full Idea
According to 'sortal essentialism', an object could not have been of a radically different kind than it in fact is.
Gist of Idea
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
Source
Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §4)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.9
A Reaction
This strikes me as thoroughly wrong. Things belong in kinds because of their properties. Could you remove all the contingent features of a tiger, leaving it as merely 'a tiger', despite being totally unrecognisable?
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |