more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 10944

[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition ]

Full Idea

We can assign a term to any 'account' whatever, so that the Iliad would be a definition! No, a definition must be of something primary.

Gist of Idea

A definition must be of something primary

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a08)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.180


A Reaction

At first hearing you may doubt this claim, but Aristotle's example clinches it beautifully. Are you really going to say that The Iliad is the definition of 'Iliad'?


The 25 ideas with the same theme [give the true nature of something, not just a description]:

A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]