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Single Idea 10983
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
]
Full Idea
The modal Platonist denies that knowledge always depends on a causal relation. The reality of possible worlds is an ontological requirement, to secure the truth-values of modal propositions.
Gist of Idea
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics
Source
Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.52
A Reaction
[Reply to Idea 10982] This seems to be a case of deriving your metaphyics from your semantics, of which David Lewis seems to be guilty, and which strikes me as misguided.
Related Idea
Idea 10982
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[existence of non-actual possible worlds]:
19402
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The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible
[Leibniz]
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19434
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There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues
[Leibniz]
|
15883
|
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility
[Leibniz, by Harré]
|
18822
|
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class
[Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
|
7837
|
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things
[Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
|
14460
|
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary
[Russell]
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5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
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23470
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Each thing is in a space of possible facts
[Wittgenstein]
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11183
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The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects)
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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16957
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Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility
[Dummett]
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc.
[Plantinga]
|
4943
|
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
[Kripke]
|
11984
|
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
[Plantinga]
|
4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
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16429
|
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
[Stalnaker]
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16398
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Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
[Stalnaker]
|
16397
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If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
[Stalnaker]
|
16399
|
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
[Stalnaker]
|
9669
|
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
7691
|
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
[Jacquette]
|
10266
|
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic?
[Shapiro]
|
4207
|
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds
[Lowe]
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19279
|
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary?
[Hale]
|
10983
|
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics
[Read]
|
7792
|
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics
[Girle]
|
5734
|
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives
[Melia]
|
5742
|
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers
[Melia]
|
5743
|
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal
[Melia]
|
5749
|
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books
[Melia]
|
18745
|
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
18747
|
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
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17956
|
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
[Vetter]
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