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Full Idea
There are two main forms of actualism: reductionism, which seeks to construct possible worlds out of some more mundane material; and moderate realism, in which the actual concrete world is contrasted with abstract, but none the less real, possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions)
Source
Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.106
A Reaction
I am a reductionist, as I do not take abstractions to be 'real' (precisely because they have been 'abstracted' from the things that are real). I think I will call myself a 'scientific modalist' - we build worlds from possibilities, discovered by science.
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |