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Single Idea 11038

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties ]

Full Idea

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance.

Gist of Idea

We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances

Source

Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Categories and De Interpretatione', ed/tr. Ackrill,J.R. [OUP 1963], p.7

A Reaction

This is the key passage in all of Aristotle for sortal essentialists like Wiggins, especially the word 'only'. I take it that this observation is superseded by the Metaphysics. Definition is the route to substance (which involves general terms).

Related Idea

Idea 16495 The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]

The 29 ideas with the same theme [actualised properties, rather than conditional ones]:

11032 Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
11038 We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
5469 The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
13577 Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
9436 The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
14501 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]