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Single Idea 11052

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

With the psychological conception of logic we lose the distinction between the grounds that justify a conviction and the causes that actually produce it.

Gist of Idea

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief

Source

Gottlob Frege (Logic [1897] [1897])

Book Ref

Frege,Gottlob: 'Posthumous Writings', ed/tr. Hermes/Long/White etc [Blackwell 1979], p.147


A Reaction

Thus Frege kicked the causal theory of justification well into touch long before it had even been properly formulated. That is not to say that there is no psychological aspect to logic, because there is.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]