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Single Idea 11057
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
]
Full Idea
Good does not, by definition, mean anything that is natural; and it is therefore always an open question whether anything that is natural is good.
Gist of Idea
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
Source
G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903], §027)
Book Ref
Moore,G.E.: 'Principia Ethica' [CUP 1980], p.44
A Reaction
This is the best known modern argument for Platonist idealised ethics. But maybe there is no end to questioning anywhere, so each theory invites a further question, and nothing is ever fully explained? Next stop - pragmatism.
Related Ideas
Idea 3894
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
Idea 22754
Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
The
23 ideas
from G.E. Moore
21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related
[Moore,GE, by Heil]
|
17992
|
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
[Moore,GE]
|
7527
|
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
|
6405
|
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism
[Moore,GE, by Grayling]
|
22302
|
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
[Moore,GE, by Potter]
|
7526
|
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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8039
|
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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22151
|
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction
[Boulter on Moore,GE]
|
8033
|
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
|
8032
|
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
|
11050
|
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent
[Hanna on Moore,GE]
|
23726
|
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism
[Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
|
5925
|
The three main values are good, right and beauty
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
|
5902
|
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
|
5907
|
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them
[Ross on Moore,GE]
|
11057
|
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
[Moore,GE]
|
11056
|
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
[Moore,GE]
|
5903
|
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
[Moore,GE]
|
18676
|
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
[Moore,GE]
|
21233
|
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
[Moore,GE]
|
6349
|
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
[Moore,GE]
|
20147
|
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
[Moore,GE]
|
6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
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