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Full Idea
Kripke argues that the 'rule-following paradox' is essential to the more controversial private language argument, and introduces a radically new form of scepticism.
Gist of Idea
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1
Book Ref
Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.160
A Reaction
It certainly seems that Kripke is right to emphasise the separateness of the two, as the paradox is quite persuasive, but the private language argument seems less so.
| 7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
| 11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
| 19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
| 19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |