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Full Idea
If we take account of the fact that a speaker is in a community, then we must adopt an assertability-conditions semantics (based on what is legitimately assertible), and reject truth-conditional semantics (based on correspondence to the facts).
Gist of Idea
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1
Book Ref
Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.163
A Reaction
[Part of Hanna's full summary of Kripke's argument] This sounds wrong to me. There are conditions where it is agreed that a lie should be told. Two people can be guilty of the same malapropism.
7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |