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Single Idea 11088
[filed under theme 2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
]
Full Idea
Informal fallacies: appeals to force, circumstantial factors, ignorance, pity, popular consensus, authority, generalisation, confused causes, begging the question, complex questions, irrelevance, equivocation, black-and-white, slippery slope etc.
Gist of Idea
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies
Source
Robert Hanna (Rationality and Logic [2006], 7.3)
Book Ref
Hanna,Robert: 'Rationality and Logic' [MIT 2006], p.218
The
28 ideas
from 'Rationality and Logic'
11047
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Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence
[Hanna]
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11048
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Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths
[Hanna]
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11046
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Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths
[Hanna]
|
11045
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Most psychologists are now cognitivists
[Hanna]
|
11053
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Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction
[Hanna]
|
11051
|
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition
[Hanna]
|
11055
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Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection
[Hanna]
|
11054
|
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences
[Hanna]
|
11058
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Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals
[Hanna]
|
11059
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Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible
[Hanna]
|
11061
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Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts
[Hanna]
|
11063
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Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity
[Hanna]
|
11067
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Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity
[Hanna]
|
11068
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One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic
[Hanna]
|
11070
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'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ
[Hanna]
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11071
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'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ
[Hanna]
|
11072
|
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core
[Hanna]
|
11078
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Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential
[Hanna]
|
11077
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Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences
[Hanna]
|
11080
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Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception
[Hanna]
|
11081
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Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions
[Hanna]
|
11082
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Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery?
[Hanna]
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11083
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A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds
[Hanna]
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11086
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Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)
[Hanna]
|
11085
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Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws
[Hanna]
|
11084
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Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts
[Hanna]
|
11089
|
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology
[Hanna]
|
11088
|
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies
[Hanna]
|