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Single Idea 11107
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
]
Full Idea
Suppose there happen to be no other concrete realms. Would we happily accept the consequence that we exist necessarily?
Gist of Idea
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
Source
Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2007], p.100
The
14 ideas
from 'Analyzing Modality'
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
[Jubien]
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
[Jubien]
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
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11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
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11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
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11116
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Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
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11117
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Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
[Jubien]
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11115
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'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
[Jubien]
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11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
[Jubien]
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11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
[Jubien]
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