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Single Idea 11110
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
]
Full Idea
If someone similar to Humphrey won the election, that nicely establishes the possibility of someone's winning who is similar to Humphrey. But we mustn't confuse this possibility with the intuitively different possibility of Humphrey himself winning.
Gist of Idea
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
Source
Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2007], p.102
The
14 ideas
from 'Analyzing Modality'
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
[Jubien]
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
[Jubien]
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
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11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
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11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
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11116
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Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
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11117
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Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
[Jubien]
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11115
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'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
[Jubien]
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11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
[Jubien]
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11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
[Jubien]
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