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Single Idea 11111
[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
]
Full Idea
Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities.
Gist of Idea
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
Source
Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2007], p.104
A Reaction
I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic.
The
14 ideas
from 'Analyzing Modality'
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
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11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
[Jubien]
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
[Jubien]
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11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
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11115
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'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
[Jubien]
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11116
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Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
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11117
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Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
[Jubien]
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11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
[Jubien]
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11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
[Jubien]
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