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Single Idea 11115

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification ]

Full Idea

Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'.

Gist of Idea

'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses

Source

Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)

Book Ref

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2007], p.107

A Reaction

Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116.

Related Idea

Idea 11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]

The 52 ideas from Michael Jubien

11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
13375 The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien]
13376 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
13378 It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien]
13374 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
13377 First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
13379 If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien]
13381 Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien]
13382 Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien]
13383 If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien]
13380 Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien]
13384 Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien]
13385 Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien]
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
13391 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
13392 Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien]
13393 Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien]
13394 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
13395 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien]
13396 Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien]
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
13400 If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien]
13401 The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien]
13403 The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien]
13402 We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
13404 To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien]
13405 The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]