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Full Idea
Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'.
Gist of Idea
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
Source
Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2007], p.107
A Reaction
Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116.
Related Idea
Idea 11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |