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Single Idea 11124

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations ]

Full Idea

A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly.

Gist of Idea

Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations

Source

E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4

A Reaction

[They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology.

The 23 ideas from 'Concepts'

11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
11122 A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
11121 Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
11124 Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
11123 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
11125 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
11128 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
11130 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
11129 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
11131 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
11132 The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
11133 Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
11134 People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
11135 Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
11136 Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
11137 The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
11138 The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
11139 Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
11140 Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
11141 Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
11142 Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
11146 People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
11147 Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]