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Single Idea 11126

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Frege notes that an expression without a referent ('Pegasus') needn't lack a meaning, since it still has a sense, and the same referent (Eric Blair) can be associated with different expressions (George Orwell) because they convey different senses.

Gist of Idea

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4


A Reaction

A nice neat summary of the value of Frege's introduction of the sense/reference distinction, which seems to me to be virtually undeniable (a rare event in modern philosophy).


The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]