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Full Idea
We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem.
Gist of Idea
If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
Source
Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.5
A Reaction
I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed.
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |