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Single Idea 11127

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations ]

Full Idea

We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem.

Gist of Idea

If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?

Source

Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.5

A Reaction

I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed.

The 21 ideas from Christopher Peacocke

17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
11127 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]