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Single Idea 11130

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts ]

Full Idea

The classical view is challenged by the discovery that certain categories are taken to be more typical, with typicality widely correlating with other data. Apples are judged to be more typical of (and have more common features with) fruit than plums are.

Gist of Idea

Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums

Source

E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 2.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7


A Reaction

This discovery that people use prototypes in thinking has been the biggest idea to ever hit the philosophy of concepts, and simply cannot be ignored (as long as the research keeps reinforcing it, which I believe it does). The classical view might adapt.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [concepts as necessary and sufficient conditions of groups]:

Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]